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CaseNo.20070771-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Rudy Damond McKnight, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas to: possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(l) (West Supp. 2006); possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 
(West 2004); and giving false information to a police officer, a class C 
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-506 (West Supp. 2007). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 
2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
1. Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective when, at argument on 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas due to discovery of an unknown 
witness, counsel proffered the witness' testimony without producing the witness 
or his affidavit or seeking a continuance to do so? 
Standard of Review. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for 
the first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \6, 
89 P.3d 162. To demonstrate ineffectiveness, "defendant must show: (1) that 
counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability 
exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a more 
favorable outcome at trial." Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 
(1984)). 
2. Has defendant shown that the trial court committed plain error in 
failing sua sponte to continue sentencing to permit defense counsel to produce a 
witness in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas where defense 
counsel invited the court to proceed with its ruling, and nothing in the record 
suggests that a more favorable result was reasonably likely had the trial court 
granted a continuance? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies where defense counsel 
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invited the error complained of. See State v. Person, 2006 UT App 288, 111 , 140 
P.3d 584 (plain error review is unavailable when defendant invites the error of 
which he complains). 
Should plain error review be granted, defendant must show that the trial 
court "committed an error that was both obvious and prejudicial/7 State v. Cruz, 
2005 UT 45,124,122 P.3d 543. Because defendant raises both plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, there is a "common standard" 
for determining prejudice. See State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511,f36,153 P.3d 
804, cert, denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 2007). Failure to meet the ineffective 
assistance of counsel standard of prejudice means that defendant likewise fails to 
meet the required showing under the plain error requirement. See State v. Brooks, 
868 P.2d 818,822 (Utah App. 1994), overruled on other grounds, State v. Clark, 913 
P.2d 360 (Utah 1996); State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,466 n.2 (Utah App. 1993); 
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170,174 (Utah App. 1992) (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules in 
this case. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History. Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony; unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; and giving false information to police, also 
a class B misdemeanor (R. 1-3). The court appointed counsel and, following a 
preliminary hearing, bound defendant over as charged (R. 9,12-14,32-33). 
Before trial, defendant entered guilty pleas to possession of a controlled 
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia as charged, and to the giving of 
false information reduced to a class C misdemeanor (R. 48-61,65-66; R. 104). In 
addition, a companion case against defendant was dismissed (R. 55; R. 104:10). 
As a factual basis for the pleas, defendant admitted that on March 26,2007, he 
"gave the wrong name to the police officers, and he was in possession of 
methamphetamine and two pipes" (R. 104:8). The court ordered a presentence 
investigation report and set sentencing for July 30,2007 (R. 65-66). 
At sentencing, defendant sought to withdraw his pleas (R. 73). He filed a 
written motion the following week, claiming to have found a witness, Mr. Jared 
Osmond, "not previously known to either the State or defense" (R. 76). 
Following argument, the court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to the 
statutory terms for each of the three crimes (R. 85-86; R. 106). The court then 
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suspended the sentences and placed defendant on probation for thirty-six 
months (R. 86-88). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 93-94). Through new coimsel, defendant 
filed a motion in this Court under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
seeking a remand so that he might present to the trial court testimony he claimed 
his trial counsel should have presented in support of the motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas. See Motion to Remand Pursuant to Rule 23B Utah R. App. P. On 
April 15,2008, this Court denied the motion, noting that defendant failed to 
"properly supportf] his motion" with "an[] affidavit detailing the witness's 
testimony or establishing prejudice." See Order Denying Remand (attached in 
Addendum A). 
On May 13,2008, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his request for a 
remand pursuant to Rule 23B, including with his motion an affidavit from the 
newly-discovered witness, Jared Osmond. See Motion to Reconsider Motion to 
Remand Pursuant to Rule 23B Utah R. App. P. By order dated June 5, this Court 
denied his request for reconsideration, finding that the affidavit did not meet the 
requirements of the rule with respect either to deficient performance or prejudice. 
See Order Denying Remand (attached in Addendum B). 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw His Pleas. At argument in the trial court 
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on defendant's motion, his counsel conceded that "[t]he plea colloquy was 
perfectly adequate[,]" but argued that withdrawal of the guilty pleas was 
warranted because, after entry of the pleas, defendant discovered another 
witness with relevant testimony (R. 106:5). Counsel proferred that the witness 
can testify that the driver admitted to him of using controlled 
substances and being in possession of the controlled substances 
We did not have that information at the time that the guilty plea was 
entered. 
(R. 106:5) (attached in Addendum C). She felt that without "full knowledge of 
the [new] evidence" when the plea was entered, the plea could not be knowing 
or voluntary (R. 106:7). When asked by the judge if the witness was present, 
counsel informed the court that he was not present, but that she had talked to 
him on the phone "and he confirmed that he would be—would appear in Court 
and would testify to what" she had just told the court (R. 106:5-6). 
The prosecutor argued that the testimony from the new witness was not 
relevant to whether the pleas were knowing and voluntary (id. at 4, 7). 
Defendant knew of the facts to which the witness would testify and he plead 
guilty with that knowledge pursuant to an admittedly valid colloquy (id. at 6-8). 
The fact that he did not know of this particular witness when he pled guilty does 
not change what defendant knew (id. at 8). The fact that the driver was using 
controlled substances or that defendant's possession may have been constructive 
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does not change his guilt or bear on the validity of his plea (id. at 6-7). 
Ruling on Motion to Withdraw Pleas. After hearing argument from the 
parties, the trial court denied the motion, addressing two points. See Add. C at 9. 
First, the court noted that "it's not helpful to the Court to have some witness who 
is not present in Court, and to not produce that witness and not have the witness 
available so the Court can judge whether or not the witness is credible in this 
instance " Id. Second, the judge addressed the pleas themselves, noting that 
he had "specifically asked for a factual basis for the plea[s]" which defendant had 
provided. Id. The judge explained 
The defendant acknowledged the possession of the controlled 
substance. Whether that was joint possession or whether that was 
individual possession [was not specified], but the defendant clearly 
acknowledged that when the plea was taken. The Court is not 
persuaded by the claims that [the witness] may have some 
information that the other person in the vehicle claimed that he also 
had possession of the substance. 
Id. The court then denied defendant's motion. Id. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Defendant was a passenger in a car stopped for a traffic violation on March 
26,2007 (R. 2). He identified himself to the officer as Angelo Iseral Miller, 
provided a date of birth, and claimed not to have identification (id.). A records 
lrThe facts are taken from the probable cause statement filed below (R. 2-3). 
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check produced no results, but the car's driver provided another 
name—Rudy—and suggested that defendant had thrown something behind his 
seat (id.). As defendant stepped out of the car, a small plastic baggie containing a 
white powder fell on the car's floor board (R. 3). The powder field-tested 
positive for meihamphetamine (id.). A wallet containing defendant's 
identification and a package containing two glass pipes were found in a search of 
the passenger area of the car (id.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective when she 
merely proffered the anticipated testimony of Mr. Osmond instead of either 
producing the witness or his affidavit or seeking a continuance to do so. See 
Aplt. Br. at 6-11. His claim fails because he makes no attempt to establish that he 
was prejudiced by counsel's performance. Instead, he seeks a remand for an 
evidentiary hearing to permit the lower court to rule on whether presentation of 
the witness or his affidavit would have made a difference in the ruling on his 
motion to withdraw his pleas. Because he fails to demonstrate the requisite 
prejudice, he cannot establish his claim of ineffective assistance. 
Point II. Defendant also argues that the trial court committed plain error 
by not sua sponte continuing the hearing to permit defense counsel time to 
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procure either the witness or his affidavit. See Aplt. Br. at 11-13. However, plain 
error review is not available because defense counsel invited any error by 
submitting the matter for a decision based only on her argument and 
representing that she had nothing further to add. 
In any event, defendant's failure to establish prejudice for his ineffective 
assistance claim defeats his plain error claim under the common standard 
applicable to both. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL 
WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT PRODUCING EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS 
OR FOR NOT SEEKING A CONTINUANCE TO DO SO, WHERE 
DEFENDANT MAKES NO SHOWING OF PREJUDICE 
Defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because 
his trial attorney simply proffered the anticipated testimony of a new witness in 
support of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, but did not provide either 
personal testimony or an affidavit from the witness or seek a continuance to do 
so. See Aplt. Br. at 1,6-11. His failure to establish prejudice defeats his claim. 
To demonstrate ineffectiveness, "defendant must show: (1) that counsel's 
performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that 
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but for the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a more favorable 
outcome at trial/7 State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6,89 P.3d 162 (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984)). Prejudice must be established as "a 
demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter[.]" State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 
50 (Utah 1998) (additional quotations and citations omitted). "Failure to satisfy 
either prong will result in our concluding that counsel's behavior was not 
ineffective." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,138,55 P.3d 1131, cert, denied, 63 
P.3d 104 (Utah 2003); see also State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86,f9,125 P.3d 930. 
This case turns on the second prong of the test.2 To establish prejudice, 
defendant here must show as "a demonstrable reality" mat a reasonable 
probability exists that presentation of the live testimony or the affidavit below 
would have resulted in a more favorable outcome—i.e., the trial court was 
reasonably likely to have granted the motion to withdraw the pleas. Chacon, 962 
P.2d at 50 (additional quotations and citations omitted); see also State v. Person, 
2In only arguing the second Strickland prong, the State does not concede 
that trial counsel's failure to adduce the witness in support of her motion to 
withdraw defendant's guilty pleas amounted to deficient performance under the 
first Strickland prong. See State v. Santana-Ruiz, 2007 UT 59, i 19,167 P.3d 1038 
("If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 
sufficient prejudice,... that course should be followed."') (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 697), reh'g denied (Aug. 8,2007). 
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2006 UT App 288, J 14,140 P.3d 584. 
Defendant makes no effort to meet this burden. He claims that his 
counsel's failure to do more than proffer the testimony of the "nominally 
exculpatory'7 witness left the trial court with "little choice but to deny" the 
motion to withdraw the pleas. Aplt. Br. at 9-10. At the same time, he offers 
nothing to suggest that producing the witness is likely to have resulted in any 
other outcome. The record does not show that testimony from the witness 
would have added anything to what counsel proferred below, and the proffer 
itself is no more than speculation concerning possession of the 
methamphetamine. The proffered testimony was not based on personal 
knowledge, and the witness cannot testify either that the driver of the car 
possessed the drugs individually or that defendant did not constructively 
possess the drugs with the driver (R. 106:5). 
Further, defendant does not address the concerns of the prosecutor and the 
court below. He does not explain how his ignorance of the witness' existence 
rendered his pleas unknowing or involuntary where, as the prosecutor observed, 
those pleas were entered with full knowledge of the facts surrounding possession 
of the methamphetamine (id. at 6-8). Neither does he address the trial court's 
observation that even if the guilty pleas were based on joint or constructive 
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possession, as suggested by his counsel, the factual basis given for the pleas 
would still support his guilt (id. at 9). 
His concession that the question of prejudice is a "difficult" one is coupled 
with an invitation for this Court "to remand this matter for an evidentiary 
hearing in order for the trial judge to make a ruling as to whether. . . he would 
have granted or not granted the motion to withdraw the guilty plea had it been 
properly supported." Aplt. Br. at 10-11. This Court has twice, however, refused 
defendant's remand requests in the absence of allegations of non-record facts 
which, if true, would establish that the witness' absence prejudiced defendant. 
See Utah R. App. P. 23B. 
In sum, defendant's speculative claim and his attempt to abdicate his 
burden to the trial court defeat his claim on appeal.3 See Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, 
\ 38 (failure to satisfy one of the required prongs prevents a finding of 
3In any event, the preferred testimony does not amount to "critical new 
evidence which cast[s] doubt on defendant's guilt[.]" State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 
1040,1042 (Utah 1987). It merely raised the possibility that someone else jointly 
possessed the methamphetamine with defendant. That does not demonstrate 
factual innocence. Thus, it is unlikely that the court would have permitted 
withdrawal of the pleas had that suggestion been presented through Mr. 
Osmond himself. See State v. Sunter, 1999 UT App 186U, *1 (no abuse of 
discretion in refusing to allow withdrawal of guilty plea where the "new 
evidence" was minor and did not "rise to a level sufficient to implicate the merits 
of the case against the defendant") (unpublished memorandum decision); see also 
Gallegos, 738 P.2d at 1042 (recognizing that "new and indisputably pivotal 
evidence" supports withdrawal of a guilty plea). 
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ineffectiveness); Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 (prejudice must be "a demonstrable reality 
and not a speculative matter") (additional quotations and citations omitted). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN NOT SIM SPONTE 
CONTINUING THE HEARING NECESSARILY FAILS UNDER 
BOTH THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE AND THE COMMON 
STANDARD OF PREJUDICE APPLICABLE TO BOTH 
APPELLATE CLAIMS 
Defendant also argues that the trial court committed plain error when it 
failed sua sponte to continue the sentencing hearing to permit defendant to 
produce Mr. Osmond in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. See 
Aplt.Br.atll-13. 
This Court should refuse to review this claim because defendant invited 
the error of which he complains. Under the doctrine of invited error, this Court 
may decline to engage in plain error review "when 'counsel, either by statement 
or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she had no objection 
to the [proceedings]."' Person, 2006 UT App 288,111 (defense counsel 
affirmatively indicated that he had no objection to the trial court proceeding 
without holding a hearing or appointing new counsel) (quoting State v. Winfield, 
2006 UT 4,114,128 P.3d 1171 (alterations in original) (additional quotations 
omitted)). 
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Here, defense counsel completed her argument in support of the motion to 
withdraw the pleas, after which the following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: [Defense counsel], are you submitting it based on the 
argument today for a decision? Is that what you want to do? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, your Honor. 
1HE COURT: All right. Anything further? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Nothing further, your Honor. 
(R. 106:8). The prosecutor made an additional argument, after which, at 
defendant's urging, defense counsel reiterated that defendant was unable to 
discover Mr. Osmond until after defendant entered his pleas and was released 
(id. at 8-9). The court again asked if there was "[ajnything further" and defense 
counsel affirmatively stated, "[n]othing further, your Honor" (id. at 9). Only then 
did the trial court announce his ruling (id.) 
Defense counsel affirmatively submitted the motion based only on her 
argument to the court. She twice affirmed that she had nothing further to offer, 
thereby inviting the trial court to rule on the motion at that time (see id.). Thus, 
counsel invited any error in the court's failure to continue the hearing, and this 
Court should decline to conduct plain error review of the claim. See Person, 2006 
UTApp288,f 11. 
In any event, defendant fails to establish the prejudice necessary to prevail 
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on a claim of plain error. To obtain relief under the plain error doctrine, 
defendant must show that the trial court "committed an error that was both 
obvious and prejudicial/7 State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 24,122 P.3d 543. If either 
requirement is unmet, "plain error is not established/7 State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, 
115,95 P.3d 276 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1209 (Utah 1993)). 
When a defendant raises both the issues of plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel on direct appeal, there is a "common standard77 for 
determining prejudice. See State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, \ 36,153 P.3d 804, 
cert, denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 2007). The common standard exists because of the 
similarity in the prejudice showing for both issues. See State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 
170,174 (Utah App. 1992). Failure to meet the ineffective assistance of counsel 
standard of prejudice means that defendant likewise fails to meet the required 
showing under the plain error requirement.4 See State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818,822 
(Utah App.,1994.), overruled on other grounds, State v. Clark, 913 P.2d 360 (Utah 
App 1996); State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,466 n.2 (Utah App. 1993). 
Although defendant suggests that presenting either the witness or his 
affidavit was necessary, he has not demonstrated that doing so "would have 
altered the outcome77 of the proceedings {see Point I, supra). State v. Baker, 963 
4The State's focus on the prejudice aspect of defendant's plain error claim 
does not concede the existence of obvious error. 
15 
P.2d 801,808 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998) (quoting Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,523-24,526 (Utah 1994)). Accordingly, his plain error claim 
fails. See id.; see also State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5,137,84 P.3d 1183. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the lower court's denial 
of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
Respectfully submitted September J>2%008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KRIS e. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
8080 S. Redwood Road, Ste. 1100 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
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ADDENDUM A 
ORDER DENYING REMAND 
(dated April 15, 2008) 
AT O R B GENERAL 
APR 15 2008 [ 
TPPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
FILED V 
UTAH APPELLATE COUR" 
APR J 5 2008 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v, 
Rudy Damond McKnight, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER DENYING REMAND 
Case No. 20070771-CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and McHugh. 
This is before the court on a motion for remand under rule 
23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A remand is 
available only upon "a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not 
fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could 
support a determination that counsel was ineffective," including 
facts that show "the claimed deficient performance" and "the 
claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the 
claimed deficient performance." Utah R. App. P. 23B (a) , (b) . 
The motion must be supported by affidavits "alleging facts 
not fully appearing in the record on appeal that show the claimed 
deficient performance." Id. 23B(b). The affidavits must also 
include facts that "show the claimed prejudice suffered" as a 
result of the claimed deficient performance. Id. 
McKnight asserts that a witness found prior to sentencing 
would provide testimony which would support the withdrawal of his 
plea. However, McKnight has failed to provide any affidavit 
detailing the witness's testimony or establishing prejudice. An 
appellant must submit affidavits from the identified witnesses 
stating they are available to testify and detailing their 
testimony. See State v. Johnston, 2000 UT App 290, I 11. 
Additionally, the affidavits must contain facts that show 
deficient performance and must demonstrate prejudice to the 
appellant. See id. at II 12-13. McKnight has not properly 
supported his motion. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied. 
Dated this day of April, 2008. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, V ^ 
Presiding Judge 
20070771-CA 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on August 14, 2007) 
3 MS. CHESNUT: Could the Court call the matter of Rudy 
4 McKnight? 
5 THE COURT: This is case No. 071400707. Counsel will 
6 state their appearances, please. 
7 MS. CHESNUT: Heather Chesnut for Mr. McKnight. 
8 MR. BOWN: Chris Bown for the State. 
9 THE COURT: All right. There was a warrant issued on 
10 the 13th of August when Mr. McKnight failed to appear. 
11 I Mr. McKnight, where were you yesterday? 
12 MR. MCKNIGHT: Your Honor, I was at the — itfs a 
13 I Christian fellowship drug and alcohol rehabilitation program at 
14 the Ogden Rescue Mission in Ogden, Utah. I was given a medical 
15 bed because of my injury — my back injury, and I found out about 
16 the Christian fellowship program they had which included drug and 
17 alcohol treatment, as well as monitoring and urine analysis and 
18 breathalyzers, et cetera, and I enrolled in the program. 
19 I have to get permission — you're not supposed to 
20 J leave the properties for 30 days, sir. I had to get permission 
21 from the director to get — to leave the premises without losing 
22 I my opportunity there. They — this is a fund raising time of 
23 the year for them. They have a food service program that they 
24 vend — they use — they vend foods at festivals and county 
25 fairs, et cetera. He wasn't available. I got permission late, 
, 
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and I wasn't able to make it, sir. 
MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, if I may, Mr. McKnight has 
provided me with some documentation. I have a — some paperwork 
from McKay Dee Hospital that shows'that Mr. McKnight was treated 
for a back injury on August 2nd, and that he was then enrolled for 
a bed in the Ogden Rescue Mission Center for recovery. He was 
originally admitted for one week, and then a second week because 
of the continuing nature of the injury. 
I also have a letter from a Reverend Stubblefield, the 
chaplain of the mission who indicates that Mr. McKnight has been 
in the program. He's been in since August 5th. He had originally 
been to the St. Anne's Center after he was treated on the 2nd, and 
then he was moved to Ogden Rescue Mission on the 5th. It says 
that he has been there every day, has been involved in counseling 
and has been involved in urinalysis, and that that is when — 
where he has been since that time. 
My understanding is he failed a urinalysis on Saturday, 
and then of course he didn't appear yesterday. He telephoned me 
yesterday afternoon to tell me the reason for his non-appearance. 
Apparently he had been trying to call in the morning and I had 
not got his message since I had been in Court. I instructed him 
to appear today and he has. 
I would add, though, that there is also a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea in this case, and that was what it was 
set for yesterday. We are, I believe, prepared to argue that. 
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1 Mr. Bovm is prepared, and so we may also want to hear that before 
2 I determining Mr. McKnight's custody status. 
3 I THE COURT: All right. Letfs hear from Mr. Bown. 
4 MR. BOWN: Your Honor, the basis of a new witness is 
5 irrelevant to the determination of whether the guilt — the 
6 guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. I haven't looked over 
7 the actual transcript or anything. I don't think it's being 
8 alleged that you failed to do anything wrong on the Rule 11 
9 colloquy that you engaged with Mr. McKnight at the time of his 
10 guilty plea, so I don't think there's a basis for it. I don't 
11 think he's established a strong enough basis for withdrawal of 
12 his guilty plea at this point. 
13 I should point out, your Honor, that as part of his 
14 guilty plea another case was dismissed and we agreed to his 
15 I release. If the Court decides to grant their motion for a new — 
16 withdraw the guilty plea, I think we need to put Mr. McKnight 
17 back in the same situation he was prior to entering guilty, which 
18 I was in custody and having two cases pending, your Honor. That's 
19 the State's position. 
20 I think he needs to go into custody either way, no 
21 matter how we look at it because of his failure to comply with 
22 pre-trial service while he's been out. Despite his reasons for 
23 what he has today, I — quite frankly, it does not matter. He 
24 has failed to follow the Court's orders so he should be taken 
25 into custody in any result. 
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1 I That was the position that we were in before he entered 
2 his guilty plea. We only stipulated to his release because of 
3 his guilty plea. 
4 THE COURT: All right. Well, Ms. Chesnut, then I'll 
5 I hear from you regarding the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
6 MS. CHESNUT: Yes, your Honor, and that is correct. 
7 We are not arguing that there was a defect in the plea colloquy. 
8 The plea colloquy was perfectly adequate. 
9 We discovered another witness after Mr. McKnight 
10 I was released that we didn't know of before that was not in the 
11 I police report. The witness is a Jared Osmond who can testify 
12 that — well, it proffer enough facts so that it makes sense. 
13 It's a constructive possession defense for this possession of a 
14 controlled substance case. Mr. McKnight was a passenger in a 
15 I vehicle that was stopped. Controlled substances were found, and 
16 Mr. McKnight was cited for the offense based on the statement of 
17 the driver that the controlled substances belonged to him. 
18 We have a witness who can testify that the driver 
19 admitted to him of using controlled substances and being in 
20 possession of the controlled substances. So that is the basis 
21 for the withdrawal of the guilty plea. We did not have that 
22 information at the time that the guilty plea was entered. 
23 THE COURT: Who is that witness? 
24 MS. CHESNUT: Jared Osmond. 
25 THE COURT: Is he present? 
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1 MS. CHESNUT: I — oh, when I submitted the 
2 paperwork I forgot to add I had not been 'able to confirm 
3 this with Mr. Osmond. I had been going on Mr. McKnight's 
4 representations. Since that time I have been able to speak with 
5 Mr. Osmond on the phone, and he confirmed that he would be — 
6 would appear in Court and would testify to what I just indicated. 
7 THE COURT: But he's not here today? 
8 MS. CHESNUT: He is not here today. 
9 THE COURT: So — 
10 MR. BOWN: Your Honor, if I can just address the new 
11 witness aspect. 
12 THE COURT: Please. 
13 MR. BOWN: It doesn't change the fact, though, that 
14 Mr. McKnight stood up here and said he was guilty of the crime. 
15 I mean just because a new witness has come to light who will say 
16 the other person was using drugs, that doesn't have any bearing 
17 on the fact that Mr. McKnight stood up here and said to the 
18 Court that "I plead guilty. I know — I accept responsibility 
19 for it. I" — he adopted the facts that were given that he was 
20 in possession of a controlled substance. Whether it's 
21 construction or not —• constructive possession or not does not 
22 matter under the law. 
23 You went through the colloquy of him whether this was 
24 what he wanted to do, whether it was knowing and voluntary and he 
25 had answered yes to everything. So for him to come back and say 
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1 all of a sudden, "Oh, I found a witness'7 after we release him 
2 from jail based on his guilty plea, I find it disingenuous, quite 
3 I frankly. It has no bearing on the fact that he was found in — 
4 he came here and pled guilty and you went through Rule 11 with 
5 him and he acknowledged every single aspect of that, either 
6 through the affidavit or on the record. 
7 You know, this — what they're asking for is the basis 
8 under a new trial under a different rule, and since there was 
9 no trial they — a new witness has no bearing on the guilty plea. 
10 The question is whether it was knowing and voluntary at the time 
11 he entered the guilty plea, and they're not alleging that there 
12 was any Rule 11 problem. So I — regardless of whether this 
13 I witness is available or not or what information that witness has, 
14 J it's just irrelevant to the determination of whether his guilty 
15 plea should be withdrawn. 
16 THE COURT: All right. 
17 MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, may I respond? 
18 THE COURT: Certainly. 
19 MS. CHESNUT: Our response would be that we entered 
20 I the guilty plea on the basis of the knowledge of the evidence 
21 that was presented in police reports and at the preliminary 
22 hearing at the time. Because we didn't have knowledge of 
23 this other witness then our argument would be that it was not 
24 knowingly and voluntarily entered because we did not have full 
25 knowledge of the evidence that was available to us. 
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1 THE COURT: Ms. Chesnut, are you submitting it based on 
2 the argument today for a decision? Is that what you want to do? 
3 MS. CHESNUT: Yes, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: All right. Anything further? 
5 MS. CHESNUT: Nothing further, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Bown, anything further? 
7 MR. BOWN: I guess the only thing I'd say to that, 
8 your Honor, is it's — I understand Ms. Chesnut did not know 
9 about this person, but Mr. McKnight, who was the one responsible 
10 for entering the guilty plea, and knowing the exact facts and 
11 J knowing about the existence of these people, I mean he didn't 
12 tell Ms. Chesnut. I mean he knew all these things beforehand. 
13 I I don't know what goes on between defense Counsel, but 
14 it's — he was there regardless, and so he would have known about 
15 this individual who was driving the car. He would have known 
16 about all this stuff. Again, I find it disingenuous that all of 
17 a sudden after he's released we find out all this information — 
18 or he goes and finds out all this information as if it's 
19 unexpected. I'll submit it with that, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: All right. 
21 MR. MCKNIGHT: Your Honor, may I address the Court? 
22 THE COURT: Sir, you're represented by your attorney. 
23 Please talk to Ms. Chesnut and — 
24 (Counsel confers with client) 
25 MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, Mr. McKnight would simply like 
-9-
1 the Court to know that he made his plea in this case based on the 
2 facts that we had available. He was not able to discover the 
3 other witness because of being in jail, and I guess essentially 
4 through information he was told by others he was able to find 
5 this witness after being released. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Anything further? 
7 MS. CHESNUT: Nothing further, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: All right. Regarding the motion to withdraw 
9 defendant's guilty plea, the defendant concedes that there was a 
10 compliance with Rule 11. The — it's not helpful to the Court 
11 to have some witness who is not present in Court, and to not 
12 produce that witness and not have the witness available so the 
13 Court can judge whether or not the witness is credible in this 
14 instance, but further the Court specifically asked for a factual 
15 basis for the plea. 
16 The defendant acknowledged the possession of the 
17 controlled substance. Whether that was joint possession or 
18 whether that was individual possession, but the defendant 
19 clearly acknowledged that when the plea was taken. The Court 
20 I is not persuaded by the claims that Mr. Osmond may have some 
21 information that the other person in the vehicle claimed that 
22 I he also had possession of the substance. Based on what's been 
23 submitted, the motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea is 
24 denied. 
25 I I believe we have a pre-sentence report. How would you 
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1 like to proceed? 
2 MS. CHESNUT: We do, your Honor. I believe it would 
3 I probably be appropriate to simply proceed with sentencing today 
4 if the State is ready, since the motion to withdraw has been 
5 denied. 
6 I MR. BOWN: Your Honor, I don't have a problem with that. 
7 I I just need a copy of the pre-sentence report. 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 MS. BOWN: If you want — is this yours? 
10 MS. CHESNUT: I have two copies. 
11 MR. BOWN: Okay. She gave me a copy so — 
12 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Chesnut, are there any 
13 corrections or additions to the pre-sentence report? 
14 MS. CHESNUT: No, your Honor, we have no corrections to 
15 the report. 
16 THE COURT: Anything you'd like to say on behalf of 
17 Mr. McKnight? 
18 MR. MCKNIGHT: Pardon me, your Honor? 
19 THE COURT: Anything that Ms. Chesnut would like to say 
20 on your behalf. 
21 I MS. CHESNUT: Yes, your Honor. We would request credit 
22 for the time that Mr. McKnight has served, and I believe that 
23 is — 
24 THE COURT: Eighty-four days. 
25 MS. CHESNUT: Eighty-four days, yes. We would request 
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1 credit for that time. We would request that — I see that the 
2 recommendation is to be released to the NUCCC program, which I'm 
3 J assuming it's because it's in Ogden where Mr. McKnight lives. 
4 J If that is going to be imposed, we would request that 
5 this — despite his sentencing this Court set a review date 
6 for this. One experience I've had in the past is when it's an 
7 out-of-county program we sometimes have trouble determining 
8 transportation issues and acceptance issues in this program. So 
9 we would request a review in two months to determine whether he's 
10 been accepted in this program and for him to be released if he 
11 has. We would submit otherwise. 
12 THE COURT: All right. Mr. McKnight, anything that 
13 you'd like to say, sir? 
14 MR. MCKNIGHT: Well, your Honor, I'm a little baffled by 
15 the Court's decision as far as the plea agreement, simply because 
16 the evidence available included a statement from the driver, the 
17 co-person. Anyway, the plea agreement that I made was based on 
18 a plea agreement. It had not to do with the evidence. 
19 I have made effort to be responsible for my choices 
20 and my behavior, your Honor. I was not in possession of that 
21 substance. I made that agreement because the case would be 
22 dismissed here if I agreed to that. I do respect the Court, 
23 and I appreciate the Court's considerations in the past. I 
24 thank you, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Mr. McKnight, why did you give the officer a 
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1 name other than your own? 
2 MR. MCKNIGHT: I had a warrant at the time, which was 
3 issued on January 24th because I had sinusitis and bronchitis, 
4 and I had been unable to make it to Court because of other — I 
5 was sick. I had — I found a note for that from my doctor that 
6 I — when I was seen by the Court for that failure to appear. 
7 Strangely enough, there were other complications. I 
8 lost my job when I was incarcerated. When I got out I had 
9 problems with housing and with work, and then I got sick. 
10 That's why I — I actually called the Court. 
11 I don't know whether you ever get any of those 
12 correspondences, but I was given a new Court date, which would 
13 have been a week later. That would have been the 31st of January. 
14 I did find the note, but I do appreciate the consideration the 
15 Court has made, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: All right. 
17 MR. MCKNIGHT: I've just had a hard time. 
18 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir. 
19 Mr. Bown? 
20 MR. BOWN: Your Honor, I'd ask you to follow the 
21 recommendations. I was just going over — talking with Melissa 
22 about what his experience on pre-trial services has been to 
23 date. She counted 10 more or less missed UA's during that time. 
24 He tested positive for cocaine, the drug that he did not have 
25 apparently on this date when he was — when he pled guilty to. 
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1 He tested positive for cocaine the day out — the first day out 
2 of jail. 
3 I Mr. McKnight has been through the drug court program. 
4 I He has been through CATS. He has been through two or three, four 
5 programs. Quite frankly, at his age he should have learned by 
6 now that drugs is not the way to go, and yet we still have him 
7 here on other things. 
8 But for the fact that this is just — I don't want 
9 to say just, but that is it is possession of a controlled 
10 I substance, I don't think a prison sentence is appropriate this 
11 time. I think he should be put on zero tolerance probation, 
12 quite frankly. If he continues to use, I mean then prison is 
13 I the next stop. That's kind of where we've reached the point with 
14 Mr. McKnight. 
15 He always seems to have an excuse for why the drugs 
16 isn't his. He always seems to have an excuse of why he's not 
17 I doing things. He's know what to say because he's been involved 
18 with the Court system for so long. He knows what the Court needs 
19 to hear. He knows the talk, but he doesn't do what he's supposed 
20 to, your Honor. 
21 I think it's a lenient recommendation given his 
22 history, but I just think it's a — quite frankly, he's lucky 
23 that resources are such that we'd rather have violent offenders 
24 in prison than drug users. With that I'll submit. 
25 I don't know anything about the north — Northern 
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1 I Utah Community Correctional Center program. I don't know if 
2 that's like their CATS up there. This was prepared by an agent 
3 in Ogden, and I don't — sometimes you get different flavors 
4 depending on which county the pre-sentence report is prepared and 
5 without thought of where they're actually going to end up going 
6 to jail. 
7 1 So I agree with Ms. Chesnut's recommendation that we 
8 I have a review — a jail review a couple of months out so she 
9 can look into what this Northern Utah Community Correctional 
10 Center program is. I think we're just to the point where he just 
11 needs to be put in custody and wait for that correctional center 
12 to open up. So I'll submit it with that, your Honor. I — he 
13 I just has shown a disregard for the Court's orders and needs to go 
14 to jail today. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Chesnut, anything further? 
16 MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, nothing further. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Any legal reason why sentence 
18 I should not be pronounced? 
19 MS. CHESNUT: No, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Mr. McKnight, for the crime of illegal 
21 I possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, it's 
22 I the sentence of the Court that you be committed to the Utah State 
23 Prison for the indeterminate term of zero to five years and fined 
24 the sum of $5,000. 
25 For the crime of false information to a peace officer, 
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1 j a class C misdemeanor, itfs the sentence of the Court that you 
2 serve 90 days in the Salt Lake County Jail and are fined the sum 
3 of $750. 
4 J For the crime of possession of drug paraphernalia, a 
5 I class B misdemeanor, it's the sentence of the Court that you 
6 serve six months in the Salt Lake County Jail and are fined the 
7 sum of $1,000. 
8 The Court will suspend the imposition of those sentences 
9 and place you on 36-months probation with Adult Probation and 
10 Parole. The terms and conditions are that you serve 365 days in 
11 jail. The Court will give you credit towards that sentence for 
12 the 84 days that you have previously served. 
13 The Court is going to set this for a review two to three 
14 months. 
15 COURT CLERK: We could go to October 23rd at 8:30, or if 
16 you want to go to November we could go to (inaudible) . 
17 THE COURT: October 23rd should be fine. 
18 MS. CHESNUT: That should be fine. 
19 THE COURT: All right. At that time the Court will --
20 I am going to release you at some point to the Northern Utah 
21 Community Correctional Center program during the period that 
22 you're incarcerated. I don't know whether I'm going to release 
23 you on that date or not, but I intend to release you at some 
24 point, sir. 
25 That's going to be a condition of your probation 
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1 I that you successfully complete the Northern Utah Community 
2 Correctional Center program, that you pay a recoupment fee in the 
3 sum of $200 for your public defender, and a $25 Court security 
4 fee together with a $200 fine for a total of $425. That will be 
5 paid at a rate determined by Adult Probation and Parole. 
6 That you complete a substance abuse evaluation. If 
7 Adult Probation and Parole believes that it's necessary and it — 
8 that would be in addition to what is done at the Northern Utah 
9 Community Correctional Center. If Adult Probation and Parole 
10 is satisfied with what is done at NUCC they can — they have the 
11 discretion not to require a further evaluation. If a further 
12 evaluation is ordered or is required by Adult Probation and 
13 Parole you will comply with any treatment deemed necessary, 
14 I including any after care. 
15 J That you comply with the DNA testing and pay a $100 
16 I fee to a collecting agency. That when you are released that 
17 you maintain full-time verifiable employment and provide proof 
18 of that to Adult Probation and Parole. 
19 That you're subject to random urinalysis when requested 
20 by Adult Probation and Parole. That you submit your person, your 
21 vehicle and your residence to search and seizure when requested 
22 by Adult Probation and Parole. That you have no violations of 
23 the law whatsoever, excluding a minor traffic violation. 
24 Mr. McKnight, the Court is going to place you on zero 
25 tolerance. You have seen throughout your lifetime what drugs 
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1 I have done to your family. You've seen what they've done to you. 
2 You should have stopped using drugs a long time ago. Hopefully 
3 this program will be the one thing that gets you to stop using 
4 drugs, but if it is not, you're guaranteed of going to prison if 
5 you come back here and you continue to use drugs. 
6 That you report to Adult Probation and Parole within 24 
7 hours of your release from jail to initiate your probation. We 
8 will see you back here for that review in October. Good luck to 
9 you, sir. 
10 MR. MCKNIGHT: Thank you, your Honor. 
11 MR. BOWN: Is the commitment forthwith, your Honor? 
12 THE COURT: Yes, it is forthwith. 
13 UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Forthwith? 
14 THE COURT: Forthwith. 
15 (Hearing concluded) 
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